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Abstract. In this paper we propose a novel scheme that allows Windows
CardSpace to be used as a password manager, thereby improving the us-
ability and security of password use as well as potentially encouraging
CardSpace adoption. Usernames and passwords are stored in personal
cards, and these cards can be used to sign on transparently to corre-
sponding websites. The scheme does not require any changes to login
servers or to the CardSpace identity selector and, in particular, it does
not require websites to support CardSpace. We describe how the scheme
operates, and give details of a proof-of-concept prototype. Security and
usability analyses are also provided.
1 Introduction
The most common means of user authentication remains the use of passwords,
despite their well-known shortcomings. Moreover, as the number of on-line ser-
vices requiring passwords continues to grow, users increasingly re-use passwords,
write them down in insecure ways, and/or employ passwords which can be read-
ily guessed. The result is an ever-increasing risk of exposure of passwords to
malicious parties. Users also risk having their passwords stolen [1, 2] through
key logging, phishing, sniffing, shoulder surfing, etc.
A solution that enables the use of site-unique strong passwords whilst main-
taining user security and privacy is thus needed. Password managers of various
types have been proposed to meet this need [3]. A password manager stores user-
names and passwords and makes them available when required. Users are not
required to remember any passwords apart from a single master password which
can be used to lock/un-lock the password manager. Password managers can be
particularly helpful when a relatively large number of passwords are required
to access multiple on-line services. Password managers can be seen as potential
alternatives to single sign-on systems such as Windows Live ID, formally known
as Passport (http://passport.net/), and OpenID (http://openid.net/).
Windows CardSpace is a user-friendly tool supporting user authentication.
Instead of providing a username and password, a CardSpace user selects a virtual
card, known as an information card (InfoCard), from an intuitive user interface
provided by the CardSpace identity selector (CIdS), to sign on to a website.
Despite the introduction of CardSpace (and other similar systems), the vast
majority of websites still use username-password for authentication, and this is
likely to continue for at least the next few years [2]. One major problem with
CardSpace, and with other similar systems providing more secure means of user
authentication, is that the transition from username-password to full-blown iden-
tity management is extremely difficult to achieve. Service providers (SPs) will
not wish to do the work necessary to support CardSpace if very few users employ
it; equally, users are hardly likely to use CardSpace if it is only supported by a
small minority of websites. The scheme we describe is designed to help overcome
this barrier to change by allowing an evolutionary deployment of CardSpace,
initially as a password manager and subsequently, once users are familiar with
its interface, as a more sophisticated means of user authentication.
In this paper we propose a simple scheme that uses the CIdS as a password
manager. The goal is to develop a simple and intuitive approach to password
management, transparent to both the CIdS and SPs. The technique we describe
works with existing servers without any modifications, and, in particular, SPs
are not required to support CardSpace.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents an
overview of CardSpace, and Sect. 3 describes the proposed scheme. We describe
a prototype implementation in Sect. 4, and, in Sect. 5, we provide security and
usability analyses. Sect. 6 reviews related work and Sect. 7 concludes the paper.
2 CardSpace
This section gives a brief introduction to CardSpace, including a description of
the use of CardSpace personal cards.
2.1 Introduction
Microsoft CardSpace is an identity management system that provides a secure
and consistent way for users to control and manage personal data, to review
personal data before sending it to a website, and to verify the identity of visited
websites. It also enables websites to obtain personal information from users, e.g.
to support user authentication and authorisation.
The CIdS enables users to manage digital identities issued by a variety of
identity providers (IdPs), and use them to access on-line services. Digital identi-
ties are visually represented to users as InfoCards, and are implemented as XML
files that list the types of claim made by one party about itself or another party.
The concept of an InfoCard is inspired by real-world cards, e.g. credit cards.
Users can employ one (virtual) InfoCard to identify themselves to multiple web-
sites. Alternatively, separate InfoCards can be used in distinct situations. Web-
sites can request different types of cards and/or different types of claims.
There are two types of InfoCards: personal (self-issued) cards and managed
cards. Personal cards are created by users themselves, and the claims listed in
such an InfoCard are asserted by the self-issued identity provider (SIP) that
co-exists with the CIdS on the user machine. Managed cards, on the other hand,
are obtained from remote IdPs [4–8].
By default, CardSpace is supported in Internet Explorer (IE) from version
7 onwards. Extensions to other browsers, such as Firefox1, and Safari2 also ex-
ist. Microsoft has recently released an updated version of CardSpace, known as
Windows CardSpace 2.0 Beta 23. However, in this paper we refer throughout
to the CardSpace version that is shipped by default as part of Windows Vista
and Windows 7, which has also been approved as an OASIS standard under the
name ‘Identity Metasystem Interoperability Version 1.0’ (IMI 1.0) [9].
2.2 Personal Cards
The core idea introduced here is to use CardSpace personal cards to enable users
to seamlessly authenticate to websites using stored passwords. We therefore first
describe how personal cards are used.
Overview. Prerequisites for use of a personal card include a CardSpace-enabled
relying party (RP) and a CardSpace-enabled user agent, e.g. a web browser
capable of invoking the CIdS. The CIdS enables the creation of personal cards,
which currently support 14 editable claim types, namely First Name, Last Name,
Email Address, Street, City, State, Postal Code, Country/Region, Home Phone,
Other Phone, Mobile Phone, Date of Birth, Gender, and Web Page.
Using Personal Cards. When using personal cards, CardSpace adopts the
following protocol. We assume here that the RP does not employ a security
token service (STS)4.
1. User agent → RP. HTTP/S request: GET (a login page).
2. RP → user agent. HTTP/S response. A login page is returned containing
CardSpace-enabling tags in which the RP security policy is embedded.
3. The user agent offers the user the option to use CardSpace (e.g. via a button
on the RP web page), and selection of this option causes the agent to invoke
the CIdS and pass it the RP policy. Note that if this is the first time that
this RP has been contacted, the CIdS will display the RP identity and give
the user the option to either proceed or abort the protocol.
4. After evaluating the RP policy, the CIdS highlights the InfoCards match-
ing the policy, and greys out the rest. InfoCards previously used for this
particular RP are displayed in the upper half of the selector screen.
5. The user chooses a personal card. (Alternatively, the user could create and
choose a new personal card). At this point the user can check the requested
claim types and decide whether or not to proceed. Note that the selected
InfoCard may contain several claims, but only the claims explicitly requested
in the RP security policy will be passed to the requesting RP.
1 https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/10292
2 http://www.hccp.org/safari-plug-in.html
3 http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd996657(WS.10).aspx
4 An STS is a software component responsible for security policy and token manage-
ment within an IdP and, optionally, within an RP.
6. The CIdS creates and sends a SAML-based request security token (RST)
to the SIP, which responds with a SAML-based request security token re-
sponse (RSTR).
7. The RSTR is then passed to the user agent, which forwards it to the RP.
8. The RP validates the received SAML token, and, if satisfied, grants access
to the user.
Details of how CardSpace managed cards are used are given in the relevant
specifications [4–6, 9].
3 A CardSpace-based Password Manager (CPM)
We next give an overview of the CPM, covering relevant operational aspects.
3.1 Browser Extension
The CPM is based on a browser extension that can read and modify browser-
rendered web pages. It can also read CardSpace-issued RSTR tokens. In addition
it can automatically fill and submit login forms, start automatically, and be
enabled or disabled by the user.
3.2 PassCards
Either prior to, or during, use of the CPM, the user must first create a personal
card, referred to here as a PassCard, containing a username and password. Ba-
sic protection against phishing is provided if the URL of the target website is
included in the PassCard. However, this is optional, as users may wish to use a
single PassCard with multiple websites sharing the same user credentials.
The browser extension is responsible for adding the PassCard logo (see Fig. 3),
a modified version of the CardSpace logo, to the SP web page, enabling the user
to invoke the CIdS and to subsequently select (or create) a PassCard.
3.3 System Parties
The parties involved are as follows.
– An SP, i.e. a website that the user is currently visiting.
– A CardSpace-enabled user agent (e.g. a suitable web browser, such as IE8).
– A browser extension implementing the protocol described below.
3.4 Message Flows
The protocol steps, as shown in Fig. 1, are as follows.
1. User agent → SP. HTTP request: GET (a login page).
2. SP → user agent. HTTP response: (the login page is returned).
3. The browser extension performs the following processes using the login page
provided by the SP.
(a) It scans the page for a login form containing a username and password
field and a submit button.
(b) If all of these are found, it highlights the username and password fields.
(c) It adds CardSpace-enabling tags to the login page, setting the associated
security policy to require a token asserting claims of the types in which
the user credentials are stored (see Sect. 3.5 for a discussion of what
occurs when interacting with SPs that already support CardSpace.)
(d) It adds a function to the login page to intercept the RSTR that will later
be returned by the CIdS.
(e) It causes the PassCard logo to appear above the submit button, in such
a way that clicking it invokes the CIdS.
4. The user clicks on the PassCard logo and the CIdS lights up. If this is the
first time that this SP has been contacted, the CIdS will display the SP
identity and give the user the option to either proceed or abort the protocol.
On proceeding, the CIdS highlights the InfoCards that match the policy
statement added by the browser extension, and greys out the rest. InfoCards
previously used for this SP are displayed in the upper half of the selector
screen.
5. The user selects and submits a PassCard. Alternatively, the user could create
and choose a new PassCard. The CIdS creates and sends a SAML-based RST
to the SIP, which responds with a SAML-based RSTR.
6. The CIdS passes the RSTR to the browser.
7. The browser extension performs the following tasks.
(a) It intercepts and parses the RSTR.
(b) If the RSTR contains the URL of the target website, it compares it with
the URL of the visited website, and only proceeds if they match.
(c) It extracts the username and password values.
(d) It auto-populates and auto-submits the login form.
8. The SP verifies the credentials, and, if satisfied, grants access.
Note that the CPM user experience is precisely the same to that of ‘conventional’
password-based authentication except that, instead of manually entering and
submitting a username and password, the CPM user selects and submits a virtual
card.
3.5 CardSpace-enabled SPs
Regardless of whether or not an SP already supports CardSpace, the browser
extension will always add the PassCard logo to the SP web page, as long as
it detects username-password prompts on the page. This means that, if an SP
supports CardSpace and simultaneously supports username-password authenti-
cation, as does the ‘myOpenID’ website (https://www.myopenid.com/ [sampled
on 5/1/2010]), the browser extension will still insert the PassCard logo above the
submit button of the password-based login form. Informal tests on the prototype
Fig. 1. CPM message exchanges
implementation (see Sect. 4) suggest that this will not disrupt the normal oper-
ation of CardSpace; indeed, the browser extension does not modify the original
SP-CardSpace-enabling tags in any way.
The SP page will thus display the CardSpace and PassCard logos. In this
case, users will have (at least) three login options:
1. populating the username and password fields and submitting the login form
manually;
2. using the CPM to automatically populate and submit the login form; or
3. clicking the CardSpace logo to use CardSpace-based authentication.
Note that hovering the mouse over the PassCard logo results in the display of
text indicating that clicking it will activate the CPM.
4 Prototype Realisation
We next give details of a prototype implementation of the scheme.
The prototype is coded as a plug-in5 using JavaScript [10], chosen because
its wide adoption should simplify the task of porting the prototype to a range of
other browsers. It uses the Document Object Model (DOM) [11] to inspect and
manipulate HTML pages and XML documents. We plan to publish the CPM
prototype as an open source research project.
4.1 Registration
Prior to, or during, use of the CPM, the user invokes the CIdS and creates
a PassCard, inserting their username in the firstname field and password in
the lastname field. Optionally, the user could also insert the URL of the target
website in the webpage field6 (see Sect. 3.2). For ease of identification, the user
can give the PassCard a meaningful name, e.g. of the corresponding website.
The user can also upload an image for the PassCard, e.g. containing the logo of
the intended site. Example PassCards are shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. PassCards
4.2 Implementation
The prototype implements the message exchanges specified in Sect. 3.4; we refer
throughout to the step numbers given there.
Prototype-specific Implementation Details. In step 3, the plug-in pro-
cesses the SP web page in the following way.
5 The term ‘plug-in’ is used here to refer to any client-side browser extension, such as
a user script, plug-in, etc.
6 The web page field was chosen to contain the URL of the target website since it
seemed the logical choice; however, this is an implementation option.
1. The plug-in scans the web page for a login form containing a pair of username
and password fields and a submit button. More specifically, the following
procedure is used.
(a) The plug-in scans the web page for a form tag.
(b) If a form tag is found, it searches the form for three input tags referring
to username, password, and submit, as follows:
i. it searches for an input tag of type ‘text’;
ii. if found, it searches for another input tag of type ‘password’; and
iii. if found, it searches for another input tag of type ‘submit’7.
(c) If all three fields are detected, then the plug-in highlights the username
and password fields in green for ease of identification.
The above process involves the following detailed processing.
– Highlighting does not take place unless both the username and password
fields and the submit button have been detected in a single form, as a
web page could potentially contain more than one input tag of type
‘text’, such as those used for searching.
– To differentiate between registration and login web pages, the plug-in
terminates if it detects more than one password field between the user-
name and submit fields. Whereas it appears common for a login page to
only have a single password field before the submit button, registration
pages typically have two password fields (before the submit button): the
first for the user to enter their password, and the second to confirm their
password. Examples include the registration and login pages hosted by
major websites, such as Google, YouTube, Yahoo, Microsoft Research,
SpringerLink8, etc.
– When searching for the form submission button, if no submitting in-
put tag has been found the plug-in searches for an ‘image’ tag. This is
because, instead of a submit button, some websites display a clickable
image9 with similar functionality.
– Whereas it appears common for a username field to be immediately fol-
lowed by a password field, a submit button may not always immediately
follow a password field. For example, some major websites (e.g. Google,
YouTube, Yahoo, Gmail, SpringerLink) add a ‘Stay signed in’ or ‘Re-
member me’ check box between the password field and the submit but-
ton10. The plug-in addresses this issue by skipping all tags between the
password field and the submit button, including those of type ‘checkbox’.
2. The plug-in adds an HTML object tag that allows the user to invoke the
CIdS. Within the object tag, the plug-in sets the param tags to indicate that
7 If no input tag of type ‘submit’ is found, the plug-in searches for an input tag of
type ‘image’ and, if still not found, it then searches for an event-based input tag of
type ‘button’.
8 Websites most recently checked on 5/1/2010.
9 This includes an image tag embedded in a hyperlink (anchor) tag, an image tag on
its own, an image tag embedded inside a button tag, an event-based button tag, etc.
10 Websites most recently checked on 5/1/2010.
the SP security policy requires PassCards to contain two fields: the first-
name and the lastname fields, (or three fields if protection against phishing
is required, in which case the third field would be the web page field). Alter-
natively, the security policy could be configured so that the web page field
is optional.
3. The plug-in adds a function to the head section of the SP login page to
intercept the XML-based RSTR message returned by the CIdS.
4. The plug-in inserts the PassCard logo in the login web page, causing it
to appear just before the ‘login’ button, as shown in Fig. 3. The logo is
associated with an ‘on-click’ event so that, if clicked, the CIdS is invoked
(after calling the added function). To cater for users with sight difficulties or
web browsers configured not to display images, a text field can replace the
logo. This text is also displayed when the mouse is held over the PassCard
logo, indicating that the CPM can be used to sign on.
After step 6, the plug-in performs the following steps.
1. It intercepts the XML-based RSTR using the added function.
2. It parses the intercepted token and extracts the values of the firstname and
lastname fields. The plug-in uses an XML parser built into the browser
to read and manipulate the intercepted XML token. The plug-in passes the
token to the parser, which reads it and converts it into an XML DOM object
that can be accessed and manipulated by JavaScript.
3. If a URL is stored in the PassCard, it compares the stored URL with the
URL of the visited website, and only proceeds if they match.
4. It automatically fills in the username and password fields with the firstname
and lastname values, respectively.
5. It auto-submits the login form using the JavaScript ‘click()’ method.
Fig. 3. PassCard logo
Coding Environment. The JavaScript-driven plug-in was built using IE7PRO,
an IE extension, chosen to simplify prototype implementation. Users of the pro-
totype must therefore install IE7PRO, freely available at the IE7PRO website
(http://ie7pro.com), prior to installing the CPM plug-in. To enable or dis-
able the prototype, a user can simply tick or un-tick the appropriate entry in
the ‘IE7PRO Preferences’ interface, thus meeting the final objective listed in
Sect. 3.1.
An IE7PRO-free version has also been produced. In this latest version, the
JavaScript code is executed using a C#-driven browser helper object (BHO),
a Dynamic-link library (DLL) module designed as a plug-in for IE that, once
installed, attaches itself to IE, thus gaining access to the current page’s DOM.
The CPM prototype can readily be enabled or disabled using the add-on manager
in the IE Tools menu.
5 Discussion and Analysis
We now consider a number of CPM features, and also review certain limitations.
5.1 CPM Features
Security. The CPM takes advantage of the CIdS, and is supported by its built-
in security features. For example, when invoked, the CIdS runs in a separate
private desktop session, preventing other applications, e.g. malware, from inter-
acting or interfering with it. In addition, all values inserted in the fields of a
PassCard are stored in encrypted form on the user machine.
Furthermore, in protocol step 4 of the CPM, the CIdS identifies the SP
to the user and indicates whether or not they have visited that particular SP
before; if the user is visiting this SP for the first time, CardSpace requests the
user’s permission to proceed11 (see section 3.4). This helps to support mutual
authentication since the user and the SP are both identified to each other.
As with any local password manager, the CPM avoids the need for trusted
third parties. In addition, the automatic form-filling feature reduces exposure to
shoulder-surfing attacks and also helps to thwart key loggers.
The CPM reduces the threat of phishing attacks involving impersonation of
legitimate sites by comparing the URL in the PassCard with that of the visited
website. The CPM also supports the use of strong per-site passwords, since users
no longer need to memorise or write down passwords.
Finally, the CPM browser extension does not require any changes to default
IE security settings, thus avoiding potential vulnerabilities resulting from lowered
browser security settings.
11 This enhances security by comparison with ‘conventional’ password-based authenti-
cation, where the SP is not identified to the user.
Usability. The CPM provides a simple, intuitive user experience through its
use of the CIdS interface. At the same time, it familiarises users with CardSpace,
thereby potentially facilitating future adoption of more secure means of authen-
tication. Unlike other password managers which represent credentials in text
form, CPM credentials are stored in PassCards which can be equipped with a
readily recognisable image, e.g. an SP logo.
The CPM operates completely transparently to external parties, and hence
does not require any changes to SPs, identity selectors or to default browser se-
curity settings. The scheme is also highly flexible, since users can choose whether
or not to use it simply by electing to click the PassCard logo (or not).
Finally, by making use of CardSpace features, the CPM supports a degree
of roaming. A user can transfer PassCards from one PC to another using the
CardSpace backup facilities. Indeed, if the CardSpace backup file (which holds
data in encrypted form) is stored on a portable storage medium (e.g. a USB
drive) then full mobility is provided, as well as robustness in the form of protec-
tion against loss of credential data.
5.2 Limitations and Countermeasures
Perhaps the most obvious limitation of the CPM is that anyone with access to a
Windows user account can access the PassCards and use the stored credentials.
This is a fundamental limitation of CardSpace which, by default, does not impose
any additional password protection on the use of the CIdS. To address this issue,
we observe that CardSpace allows individual InfoCards to be PIN-protected,
which should be seriously considered for PassCards stored on a machine which
is not physically secure. In addition, it may be possible to cause CardSpace
to run under User Account Control (UAC), so that running CardSpace causes
Windows to prompt the user for an admin password.
The version of the CPM prototype described in this paper does not work as
intended with websites employing TLS/SSL encryption because, if the SP has
a certificate, then the CIdS will, by default, encrypt the SAML-based RSTR
message using the public key of the requesting SP. The plug-in does not have
access to the SP’s private key, and hence will be unable to decrypt the token.
As a result, the CPM will not be able to perform automatic form-filling as it
cannot obtain the username/password values. However, because the CPM (if
clicked) automatically invokes the CIdS, users could manually copy and paste
the required credentials from the relevant PassCard into the login form. This is
particularly simple if only a password is needed.
A more satisfactory solution to this issue would be to configure the CPM to
redirect the user to an (arbitrary) HTTP-based website whenever an HTTPS-
based website is visited. In this case, the CPM could read the SAML token
returned from the CIdS as it would not be encrypted. The CPM could then sub-
mit the credentials automatically to the target HTTPS-based site. The transfer
could be achieved using hidden HTML form variables or URL query parameters.
We are currently developing a prototype to realise this.
The browser extension must scan every browser-rendered web page to detect
whether it supports username-password authentication, and this may affect sys-
tem performance. However, informal tests on the CPM prototype suggest that
this is not a serious issue. In addition, the browser extension can be configured
so that it only operates with certain websites.
The current CPM prototype has not yet been tested with the recently released
CardSpace 2.012. We are thus unable to provide precise operational details for
this version.
Finally, older browsers (or browsers with scripting disabled) may not be
able to run the CPM, as it was built using JavaScript. However, most mod-
ern browsers support JavaScript (or ECMAscript), and so this is not a major
usability obstacle.
6 Related Work
Password managers, which store passwords in a secure location either on the
user PC or remotely, are now widely available. They typically store passwords in
encrypted form and, unlike the CPM, require users to use a single master pass-
word to access the password store. Some are also capable of masking passwords,
and others, much like the CPM, provide automatic password entry. Examples of
password managers include open source schemes such as Password Safe (http://
passwordsafe.sourceforge.net/), KeePass (http://KeePass.info/), Qubli-
ette (http://tranglos.com/free/oubliette.html), Password Gorilla (http:
//fpx.de/fp/Software/Gorilla/) and PINs (mirekw.com/winfreeware/pins.
html) as well as commercial products such as RoboForm (http://roboform.
com/), Any Password (http://anypassword.com/) and Turbopasswords (http:
//chapura.com/passwordmanager.php).
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the CPM is its dependence on Card-
Space, whereas other password managers are independent applications. As a
result, the CPM can benefit significantly from the CardSpace security features.
The CPM’s use of CardSpace may also give users greater confidence in its secu-
rity features. Most importantly, it is hoped that the introduction of a scheme like
the CPM, with immediate practical benefits to the end user, will help encourage
the adoption of more sophisticated identity management systems like CardSpace.
Such identity management schemes offer the potential for a step forward in the
practice of user authentication and authorisation, with potential benefits for all
legitimate parties operating via the Internet. Indeed, without simple paths to
adoption for schemes like CardSpace, there is a danger that it and all the other
identity initiatives will fail.
12 CardSpace 2.0 has not yet been standardised; in fact, at the time of writing,
CardSpace 2.0 has only been released as a Beta prototype.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have proposed a novel scheme that enables CardSpace to be used
as a password manager. Users store their usernames and passwords in CardSpace
personal cards, and use such cards to transparently sign on to corresponding
websites. The scheme is based on a browser extension, and requires no changes
to login servers; in particular, it does not require them to support CardSpace.
Neither does the scheme require any changes to the current CIdS.
The scheme uses the CIdS interface to seamlessly authenticate users to web-
sites. It extends the use of personal cards to allow for transparent password man-
agement. Such an approach could help to extend the applicability of CardSpace,
as well as encouraging its adoption.
Planned future work includes building a portable version of the CPM to sup-
port users who do not have installation privileges or are forced to use untrusted
machines when travelling. In addition, we plan to investigate the possibility of
using CardSpace as a password-based single sign-on system.
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